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A GREAT DECADE.
In June next, the first decade of the
administration of Dr. Reed, as president of
Dickinson College, comes toan end. In no
similar period has the college made such
marked progress. Ten years ago, there were
but 250 students in Carlisle under the auspices of the institution. There are now 4.50.
The campus has been much beautified;
Chapel Hall remodelled, the Preparatory School enlarged, Denny Hall erected,
an athletic field secured. The curriculaof
the college have been developed, and several new professors added. Important additions to the endowment have been obtained. The Law School is a wholly new
creation, and, since 1890, when it opened
with but a dozen students, has grown until to-day it has over one hundred students
devoted exclusively to the study of law.
The college is more widely known than
ever before, and holds a larger place in the
thoughts of the citizens of Pennsylvania,
than at any time since its foundation.
An eloquent speaker and an indefatigable
worker, Dr. Reed has made a deeper impress oil the mind of the state, than perhaps any of his predecessors. His kindness and courtesy towards students, his
grace and dignity, his ability as a man of
affairs and administration, have secured
for him their esteem and affection. We
think it safe to predict that under Dr.

Reed's management, the college, during
the coning years, will not only maintain
the proud position which it now holds, but
will exceed all its precedents in the rateof
its growth in wealth, in the numbers of
its students, and in influence. And we
may add that in no department of the Institution is there a more cordial appreciation of the fruitfulness of his labors, than

among the students of the Law School with
whose origin his name will for all time be

inseparably associated.
But a few weeks yet remain in the school
year, and almost before it is realized, commencement will be upon us, and the class
of '99 will be ushered from its struggles in
mastering the principles of the law. in law
school, into the broader sphere of action
which awaits all those who have successfully passed through the preparatory
stages. Just how many future suprenie
court justices, governors, presidents, and
leading legal lights in general, the present
class of'99 of the Dickinson School of Law
contains, we are unable at present, with
any degree of certainty, toascertain. That
there are many, among this illustrious
class, is evident, and it is to be hoped that
the luster and power which will emanate
from their puccesses, will redound to the
fame of our alma mater, so that each may
ever be mutually proud of the other.
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Commencement time is always an inA. S. Heck, of Coudersport, Potter
teresting and attractive part of the year, county, a member of the first class which
at Dickinson. The town is filled with graduated from the law school, after its revisitors, proud fathers and mothers are on
organization, recently visited his Alnia
hand to witness the graduation of favored
Mater, on his return from the Supreme
sous and daughters, and entertainments Court.
and amusements are in evidence conDr. Reed has presented to the library, a
stantly. This year the exercises will
be particularly interesting to the Law beautifully bound set of the Statutes at
School. A large class graduates, and ar- Large of Pennsylvania. The set consists
rangements have been made for attractive of three handsome volumes.
graduating exercises. Sunday, June 4, is
Herman Berg, Jr., '96, chairman of the
baccalaureate Sunday. The President of
the College on this day addresses the as- democratic county committee, has been
sembled graduating classes of the College elected district chairman for the district
and Law School. -In the afternoon are composed of Adams, ('umberland, Dauphin, Franklin, Juniata, Lebanon, Mifflin,
interesting exercises on the campus.
Tuesday afternoon is class day for the Col- Perry and York.
lege, and Tuesday night will be held the
Jno. B. T. Caldwell, '98, of Altoona, was
graduating exercises proper of the Law
School. On this evening, F. B. Sellers, to be seen on the streets of Carlisle recently.
will deliver the oration as lass representative, and Hon. St. Clair McKelway, .the
Th e following is an interesting extract
distinguished editor of the Brooklyn from a letter received from Chas. E. DanDaiy Eagle, will deliver the commence- iels, '98: "I have recently been elected
ment oration. After the addresses have president of the West Side Board of Trade,
been delivered, the presentation of diplo- of Scranton, an influential body of the
mas and awarding of prizes, follow. Taken city."
in all the exercises will be very interestPhilip t. Radle, '98, is interested in a
ing and will furnish sources of pleasure to
very important test case in the Northumall who witness them.
berland county courts-May term.

At a meeting of the Junior Class held on
April the eighteenth, Mr. Rothermel was
elected captain of the prospective baseball
team, which is to be composed of members
of that class.
The lecture on Chief Justice Taney, delivered here recently, by Hon. George
Walter Smith, of the Philadelphia bar, appeared in the April issue of the American
Law Register, published under the auspices of the University of Pennsylvania.
Keyser, '97, is taking a prominent part
in politics in Bucks County. He was recently candidate for chairman of the
county committee and but fcr his retirement before the election, would probably
have been successftl in his candidacy.
General Horatio C. King, of New York
City, will be toastmaster at the commencement dinner at Dickinson.

Carey, '96, of Scranton, was in Carlisle
a few days last week.
The subject of the address which will be
delivered by Hon. St. Clair McKelway, on
June 6th, is "Modern American Leadership."
DELTA CHI FRATERNITY.
The national convention of the Delta
Chi Fraternity met in annual session at
Carlisle with the Dickinson Chapter on
Wednesday,, Thursday and Friday, May
3rd, 4th, and 5th.
Immediately upon the arrival of the delegates on Wednesday a session of the
board of governors was called and the order of business for the convention formulated. At eleven o'clock the convention
was called to order in Assembly Hall
which was very artistically decorated in

I
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the colors of the fraternity. At this meeting credentials were 1)resented, committees were appointed and other preliminary
business disposed of. In the afternoon,
the visiting "fratres" with the Dickinson
Chapter in a body witnessed the baseball
game between Dickinson and Susquehanna. In the evening another business
session was held after which the local
chapter of Delta Chi tendered an informal
reception to their guests at their cozy parlors in the Stuart building.
On Thursday the Dickinson Chapter
brought forth encomiums of deepest gratitude when they transported the boys via
P. & R. Ry. to Gettysburg where the genial aggregation of "Greeks" were met and
welcomed by Mayor McCammon. Carriages were in waiting and the party was
immediately driven over a part of the historic battlefield, after which dinner was
served at the Eagle Hotel. In the afternoon another excursion to that part of the
field not covered in the morning was made.
Capt. Minnich, the well-known battlefield
guide, than whom there are none better,
from all of the points of especial interest
gave very eloquent and graphic portrayals
of the events of awful bloodshed and devastation which occured there more than
three decades since. The sight was a most
impressive one and the visitors were profuse in the expression that it was the most
magnificent scene of its kind to be witnessed in all our fair land. The return to
Carlisle was made in the evening when a
most enjoyable smoker was given at the
fraternity rooms.
All of Friday was consumed in important and interesting executive sessions.
Following is the list of representatives
in attendance:-A. Dix. Bissell, Rochester,
N. Y.; Mark H. Irish, and Geo. F. MeDonnell, Toronto, Can.; E. G. Lorenzen,
Cornell; Louis R. Frankel, St. Paul,
Minn.; W. E. Chapman and H. L. Steward, Ann Arbor, Mich.; A. J. Hyatt and
R. S. Lansing, New York City; H. J.
Westwood, Buffalo, N. Y.; A. Frank John
and Herman M. Sypherd, of the Dickinson Chapter. There were also present
from among the alumni members of the
local chapter: W. Harrison Walker, Bellefonte; W. H. LeGoullon, Pittsburg; Gabriel H. Moyer, Lebanon; Chas. E. Daniels, Scranton; W. K. Shissler, Miners-

ville; G. Fred. Vowinckel, Clarion; J. S.
Omwake, Shippensburg; Caleb S. Brinton, C. C. Bashore, A. J. Feight, of Carlisle.
The grand finale of the convention was
the banquet of Friday night. Assembly
Hall,elegantly decorated and brilliantly illumined presented a most beautiful spectacle. The tables were uniquely arranged
in the form of the greek letters of the fraternity. The dinner was a most elaborate
affair, the sumptuous viands being partaken by fifty Delta Chis, Achri, Honorary
and Alumni. The post-prandial addresses
were highly enjoyable. Herman M.
Sypherd was toastmaster, and following
i.; the toast list:
Welcome -Hon. E. W. Biddle.
The Supreme Court-A. Dix. Bissel.
The Mother Chapter-E. G. Lorenzen.
The Opportunities of the Modern
Lawyer -Hon. D. H. Hastings.
Fratres in Facultate-F. C. Woodward,
LL. M.
The Modern Law Student, Theoretical
and Practical-J. W. Wetzel, Esq.
The Legal Profession, Why did I Choose
It ?-H. Silas Stuart, Esq.
Sir Edward Coke-ID. Edward Long.
The Wooly West-Louis R. Frankel.
The Ladies-Garrett B. Stevens.
Fees-Hon. James M. Weakley.
The visitors departed on Saturday leaving kindliest wishes for the continued
prosperity of the Dickinson Chalpter and
the unanimous verdict that they had enjoyed, in every way, the most successful
convention in the history of the Delta Chi
Fraternity. The three and twenty members of the Dickinson Chapter are to be
congratulated for their enterprise in undertaking so large a task and having carried it to so successful a consummation.
The next convention meets with the
New York University Chapter.
DICKINSON SOCIETY.
It is gratifying to note that the interest
which has beeen shown in the literary
work of the Dickinson Society, during the
winter, has not been distracted by the
warm weather.
This, to a great extent, is due to the fidelity of the executive committee, consisting of Messrs. Coles, Clarke and Russel, in
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arranging excellent programs. On April
14th, there was anf interesting debate on
the question : Resolved, '1-That under the
form of government now existing in the
United States there are afforded more privileges to its citizens than under that form
of government now existing in England."1
Messrs. Frantz and Shreve argued for
the affirmative and Messrs. Stauffer and
Hess for the negative. Thejudges, Messrs.
Clark, Shaffer and McUabe, gave the decision to the negative.
The meeting of April 28th, wasone of exceptional interest. The program, consistin, of a jury trial in the case of Craig vs.
Shippeiisburg Water Co., was a new departure in the history of the Society.
Messrs. Sheeline and Gery appeared as
attorneys for the l)lai tiffatid Me-srs. MacEwen and Collins for the defendant. The
attorneys exhibited exeeptional skill in
the cross ex:amination of the witiiesses and
in their addresses-to thejur-.
Professor
Voodward sat as President
Judge with Mvr. Geo. Aubrey as associate.
The jury having been charged by the associate Judge, retired and brought in a
verdict for the plaintiff.
The trial afforded an excellent drill for
the participants and a source of knowledge
to Society, and having met with such approbation, the executive committee has
arranged a similar program for next meeting.

Dickinson College and firm friend of the
Law School, Mr. Chief Justice Lore, of
Delaware. Judge Lore made our stay in
Wilmington most enjoyable and one to be
remembered.
(We bespeak for him a
hearty welcome should he again honor
our institution with a visit.)
After the concert, the home of Mr. Jos.
E. Holland, a trustee of Dickinson College, was the scene of a brilliant reception
given in our honor. Mr. Holland was a
genial host, and his hospitality was much
appreciated. From Milford we drove ten
miles to Ellendale, where we took train
for Denton. Although the drive was a
novelty in Glee Club travel it was thoroughly enjoyed by all.
At Easton we encountered the first rain
on our trip, but despite this fact a goodly
number heard the concert. We left Easton
by steamer for Baltimore immediately
after theconcert, and arrived thereat 6A.M.
From Baltimore we took train for Carlisle and arrived home at 12:27 well satisfied with the results of the trip. A word
of praise should be spoken for Manager
Hare, of the Law School for the efficient
manner in which the trip was conducted.
The law men on the club are Katz, Mearkle, Holcomb, Winlack, Devall, Mitchell Hare and Weeks.

GLEE CLUB TRIP.

WILSON vs. ERIE R. R. CO.

Inasmuch as the Law School has eight
representatives on the Dickinson College
Glee Club and Orchestra, it wits thought
that a brief account of the recent trip
taken by that organization would be of
some interest to the readers of the FoRUm.n.
The club left Carlisle on Monday, April
2nd, and visited in the order named the
following places: Wilmington, Dover,
Milford, Denton, Md., Easton, Md.
Speaking generally of the trip it may
be said that the weather was favorable,
our receptions cordial, the attendance at
our concerts good, and thd success of the
trip gratifying to the members of the
club.
Speaking of some features of the trip we
mention with pleasure our reception at
Wilmington by that loyal alumnus of

COBLENTZ and CLARK for plaintiff.
SEBRING and SHIPMAN fordefendant.
The Erie Railroad is a corporation of
the State of New York. The act of April
27th, 1898, of that state requires every railroad corporation operating a railroad in
New York more than 100 nuiles long, etc.,
to issue mileage books, with coupons. On
presentation of such book to a conductor
"on any train or any line of railroad" of
the issuing corporation, the holder "shall
be entitled to travel for a number of miles
equal to the number of coupons detached"
by the conductor. "Such mileage book
shall entitle the holder thereof to thesame
rights and privileges * * to which the
highest class ticket * * would entitle
him." For refusal to issue such book, the
corporation shall forfeit $50 "to be re-

MOOT COURT.
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covered by the party to whom such refusal
is made."
The act of April 2d, 1850, of New York,
enacts that "if any passenger shall refuse
to pay his fare, it shall be lawful for the
*
conductor * * * * to put him
out of the cars * + at any usual stopping place, or near any dwelling house, as
the conductor shall elect, on stopping the
train."
The Erie Railroad sold a 500 mile book
to John S. Wilson, for $10. Printed in the
book, is "New York State Book. Good
only for one continuous journey wholly
within the state of New York, and will
not be accepted for passage when any portion of the journey passes through any
other state." Wilson boarded a train at
Owega, N. Y., and rode to Susquehanna
Pa., using his coupons. without objection
from the conductor. At Susquehanna be
took another of defendant's trains for
Hancock, N. Y., paying fare to Deposit,
the first station in New York, and then
using his coupons for the fare from Deposit to Hancock. Returning on the same
line to Susquehanna, he did the same. At
Susquehanna he took a train for Binghampton, N. Y. The conductor-different'
from the conductors on the other trainsdenied the right to use the coupons. Wilson then paid his fare to Kirkwood, the
first station in New York, the conductor
giving him a-receipt, and telling him he
could not use coupons for tile distance beAt
tween Kirkwood and Binghampton.
Kirkwood, Wilson got off, obtained the reIate at the ticket office on showing his
receipt, and in two or three minutes, remounted the train for Bighampton. The
conductor refused to receive coupons, and
Wilson not paying fare, forcibly ejected
him from the car about one-fourth of a
mile from Kirkwood station, and not
near a dwelling house. Wilson was
compelled to hire a team to take him to
Binghampton, nine miles off. A resident
of Pennsylvania, he begins trespass on the
case in Delaware, under a statute of Delaware permitting actions ex delicto against
foreign corporations, by foreign attachnent.

The question arises can a personal action

be brought in this court by a non-resident
of the State of Deleware against a foreign
corporation. It has been frequently decided, both in the State courts and in the
courts of the United States, that personal
actions may be maintained in whatever
State service can be obtained upon the defendant.
At common law personal actions whether
ex contractu or ex ddlicto are transitory,
may be brought anywhere and are governed by the lexfari. In Leonard v. Columbia Steam Navigation Co., 84 N. Y. 48,
an action was brought in that State to recover damages for death caused by an explosion which occurred in the State of Connecticut. A recovery was permitted.
Inthe case before us the plaintiff has a
right, the foundation of which rests upon
a statute of New York, but as the action is
'transitory in its nature, the defendant can
be held liable in any court to whose jurisdiction he may be subjected by properservice or by voluntary appearance. Dennick
v. Railroad Co., 103 U. S. 17, 18.
The counsel for the defendant has urged
upon the court as an objection to its jurisdiction that the statute of New York, inposing a penalty of $50 to be recovered
against the corporation by the party aggrieved, is penal in its nature and in obedience to the maxim of international law
laid down by Chief Justice Marshall in
The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, 123, that this
court should refuse to enforce the law in
question.
Upon an examination of the adjudicated
cases it is clear that the statute referred to
is not penal in the meaning which would
forbid another State from enforcing it.
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 673.
The statute of New York in question
comes under the class affording a private
remedy to the party aggrieved and although penal in its nature, (a penalty being imposed upon the corporation for its
violation), will not come within the rule
that "No country will enforce the penal
laws of another."
By a statute of the State of Delaware
actions ex delicto may be brought against
OPINION OF THE COURT.
foreign corporations by foreign attachment process. Accordingly to the agreed
Defendant is a corporaSYPHERD J.
tion of the State of New York. Plaintiff statement of facts the plaintiff has coniplied with the terms of this statute and
is a resident of the State of Pennsylvania.
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has obtained service on the defendant. It
is therefore the conclusion of the court
upon the question of jurisdiction, that the
action can be maintained in the State of
Delaware and is properly brought.
The next question is the interpretation
of the contract upon the milage book.
The defendant claims that the entire
journey contemplated must be within the
State of New York. This is manifestly
unreasonable. Suppose A boards a train
at Albany with the intention of going to
Chicago, will it be contended that he
could not use one of these books as long as
he traveled in New York?
In principle the case before us does not
differ. Wilson, the plaintiff offered his
mileage book for passage from Susquehanna, Pa., to Binghampton, N. Y. The
conductor refused to accept the ticket and
told Wilson that he could not use it for
any part of the journey to Binghampton.
Thereupon he paid his fare to Kirkwood,
the first qtopping place in New York. Be
left the train, transacted some business
with the ticket agent, boarded the train
and again presented his mileage book for
transportation to Binghampton which the
conductor refused and ejected him in the
manner set forth in the statement.
This was the beginning of a new journey wholly within the State of New York.
Wilson had paid his fare to Kirkwood and
then his relation with the railroad company ceased until he should again board
one of their trains, or should place himself in such a position that he should be
regarded as a passenger.
The true meaning of the words quoted
from the mileage book is that the ticket
would not be good for the entire journey
if the passenger desired to make a trip,
part of which would pass through another
State. For the part of the journey within
the State of New York, the ticket would
be valid.
The fact that the conductor knew the
plaintiff intended to go to Binghampton
is immaterial. He was rightfully upon
the defendant's train, and had the proper
evidence of the right to ride to Binghampton. The conductor therefore violated a
right of the plaintiff in ejecting him from
the train, damages for which he seeks to
recover in this court.
The case therefore, is a proper one for

submission to the jury and the motion for
a non-suit is denied.
OPINION OF THE SUPREMIE COURT.

At the trial, the New York statutes were
put in evidence. They might have been
proved, by the production of a book purporting to be published by the authority
of the State, and to contain its statutes.Kean v. Rice, 12 S. & R. 203; Mullen v.
Morris, 2 Pa. 85: Bock v. Lauman, 24 Pa.
435; 1 Wharton, Evid. 281. A copy duly
authenticated, in the mode prescribed by
the Act of Congress, was sufficient. Bollinger v. Gallagher, 170 Pa. 84; Chamberlayne's Best, Evid. 456. There was no
error in the proof of the §tatutes.
The right of a railroad corporation to
eject a passenger who refuses to produce a
proper ticket, or to pay his fare, is recognized to exist independently of statute. If
Wilson by offering his coupons, entitled
himself to the contemplated carriage, a
wrong would have been committed upon
him, by his ejection; even had there been
no statute. Deitrich v. Pa. R. R. 71 Pa.
432; Vankirk v. Pa. R. R. 76 Pa. 66. In
.theabsence of proof of such statute, the
courts of Delaware would presume that its
own common law principle obtained in
New York.
But, the Act of April 2, 1850, regulates
the right of ejection of a passenger. He
may be put off, for refusal to-pay his fare,
"at any usual stopping place or near any
dwelling house." By implication, the
railroad company cannot eject at any
other point. Phettiplace v. N. P. R. R. 20
L. R. A. 48*1 (Wis).; Chicago, Etc., R. R. v.
Parks, 18 Ill. 460; Terre Haute, Etc., R. R.
v. Vanatta, 21 Il1. 186; Stephen v. Smith,
29 Vt. 160. The place at which Wilson
was put off was not near a dwelling house.
Was it "at any usual stopping place?" IIt.
was "about one-fourth of a mile" from
Kirkwood, a station. We think the court
below properly allowed the jury to say
that a point one-quarter of a mile from the
station was not at the station. A meeting of supervisors in an office a quarter of a mile from the court-house, was not
at the courthouse; Harris v. State, 72
Miss. 960; 3 Am.& Eng. Encyc. 167. Authority to erect a bridge "at the Old Town
Falls," was not an authority to erect it
one-half mile below the falls. State v.
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Old Town Bridge Co., 85 Me. 17. A
statute requiring service of a writ by leaving it with a white person "at the dwelling house," is not complied with, by leaving it with such person at a corner of the
yard of the house, one hundred and twentyfive feet from it. Kibbe v. Benson, 17
Wall. 624. A water tank one quarter mile
from the station was not "at" the station;
Chicago, etc., R. R. v. Flagg, 43 Il1. 364;
nor was a point from 40 rods to one-half
a mile from the station; Chicago, etc., R.
R. v. Parks, 18 Ill. 460; nor one a half
mile from the station, though in the same
town, I. C. R. R. v. Latimer, 128 Ill. 163.
What degree of proximateness is expressed
by the word "at" will depend on the subject matter. The object of the statute is
not difficult to discover. A pa-qsenger, in
the dark, in excessive heat or cold, in a
violent snow or rain storm, might be
seriously incommoded or imperiled, if he
had to transport himself and his baggage,
a quarter of a mile. Perhaps circumstances might have been shown, that
would have justified the decision that a
point a fourth mile from the station was
"at" the station. They have not been
shown. Inasmuch then, as Wilson was
ejected in violation of law, an actionable
tort was committed against him.
The tort however was committed in New
York. The action is in Delaware. If the
tort is to be regarded as made such, by
common law, the action for it can be
brought in any jurisdiction. So, it can,
we think, even if the tort is made such by
the New York statute. Knight v. W.
Jersey R. R. Co. 108 Pa. 2.50; Usher v. W.
Jersey R. R Co. 126 Pa. 206; Derr v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 158 Pa. 365: Phillips
v. Library Co., 141 Pa. 462; Demmick v.
R. R. Co. 103 U. S. 11; Herrick v. Minn.,
etc., R. R., 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. cases,
256; Leonard v. Columbia Steam Nav. Co.,
84 N. Y. 48. The act of April 2d, 1850,
which impliedly forbids the ejection of
the passenger elsewhere than "at" a
usual stopping place, and gives to a passenger whom the company refuses to transport to his proper destination, an action
for damages, is, in no such sense penal as
to preclude thesubstantial enforcement of
it, by treating it as the basis of a right in
another state.
But, even if the ejection of Wilson was

not improper, as to its mode, was itjustified by the facts? The Erie Railroad Co.
had sold him a 500 mile book, containlug 500 coupons, each entitling to a mile's
ride, at the rate of two cents per mile,
This book entitles itself "New York State
Book." It contains the statement, 'Good
only for one continuous journey wholly
within the state of New York, and will
not be accepted for passage when any portion of the journey passes through any
other state." "Continuous passage" or
"continuous journey" has a well defined
meaning. On an ordinary ticket; 0. C.
etc., R. F.. v. Clark, 72 Pa. 231; 3 Wood
Railway Law 1637; 25 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
1109, or on one which expressly stipulates
for aI'continuous passage," the entire trip
must, be made on the same train. The
passenger can not stop off at intermediate
points, and resume the trip on a later
train. Barker & Caflin, 31 Barb. 556;
Hamilton v. N. Y. C. R. R., 51 N. Y. ]00.
When the passenger purchases a ticket, he
of course, names the t-rminus, and he attempts to use the ticket, in order to secure
passage to that terminus.
The coupons bought by Wilson named
no termini. Each represented a mile of
travel. But the company intended to put
a restriction on their use by saying that
they should buy a mile's ride, only when
that mile was a part of "one continuous
journey wholly within the state," and that
they should "not be accepted for passage
when any portion of the journey passes
through any other state." What did it
mean? What must Wilson have unde'rstood it to mean? It plainly did not mean,
that the coupons would not be accepted,
when any portion of the journey passes
through any other state, for suchportionas
passes through any other state. Were this
the meaning, how easy to have said so.
It meant that, in that case, the coupons
should not be received for any portion of
the journey, even for that portion which
did pass through the state. The coupons
are declared to be good for what? Good
for a journey ; a continuous journey, a continuous journey wholly within New York,
and only for such continuous journey.
The continuous passage or journey is the
whole of a journey on the same train. If
Wilson had not descended from the car at
Kirkwood, could it be doubted that his
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journey w.as continuous from Susquehanna
to Binghampton? Suppose he had descended to get a cup of coffee ora sandwich,
or to talk to a friend whom he saw on the
platform, and had then remounted the
same train, would his journey have been
any the less continuous? And does his
intention to evade the prohibition upon
the use of his coupons, make his descent
from the car the terminus of one journey,
and his reaseent on the same car in two
minutes, tle commnencemnent of another?
Had Wilson waited for another train,
probably the journey would have been discontinued at Kirkwood, and, when the
other train was boarded by him, another
journey would have begun. We think it
clear that the company intended to make
the coupons as little useful as possible consistently with the statute, and purposed
that they should be usable only when the
passenger began a trip not. beyond, but in
New York by boarding a train which lie
had not previously boarded, and which he
did not intend to leave until he reached
another point in New York.
The act of April 27th, 1898, however, required the defendant "to issue mileage
books entitling the holder thereof," on the
presentation of the coupons thereof, "to
travel for a number of miles equal to the
number of coupons detached" by the conductor. The conductor may not by refusing to detach the coupons make them useless. The object of the law was to require
the comnp)any to convey amy palslenger a
mile in New York for a coupon. It no
more had the right to, s;:y that tie coupon
should be received only when the mile was
part ofajourney wholly in New York, than
to say it should be received only if the
traveller resided in New York or was
travelling without baggge, or was a imiister or a lawyer. The statute has declared
that a coupon should entitle to a mile's
ride. The imposition by the company of
limitaitiois which the law does not impose,
is pro ta/nto a violation of it.
Perhaps Wilson might have declined to
accept the book with the attempted restrictions, and sued the company for the
penalty of $30 for refusing to issue the
proper mileage book. His acceptance of
it with the restrictions does not estop him
from insisting on the use of thecoupons as
if tle restrictions had not been expressed.

The courts frequently refuse to enforce illegal qualifications of a contract, though
giving effect to its principal stipulation.
The coupon is valid, in so far as it represents a contract to convey a mile; although
the declaration that the mile must be one
of a continuous journey begun and ended
in New York, is unenforceable.
The statute implloses the penalty of $60,
not only for refusing to issue the mileage
book, but also for refusing to accept such a
book, when issued, for transportation. We
do not understand that the object-of Wilson's action is to recover this penalty. If
it was we should have difficulty in coneluding that lie could appeal to the Delaware courts to assist him. His action,
rather, is brought to recover damages for
the unlawful ejection from the train, and
this ejection lie alleges to be unlawful because (1) it occurred at a place at which it
was forbidden to be tnade by the New
York statute of April 2d, 1860, and because
(2) there was no justification for an ejection at any place, inasmuch as the coupon
tendered ought to have been received.
Had the defendant had the right to restrict the coupons as it did, its ejection of
the plaintiff would have been defensible,
had it occurred at the proper p.ace. He
had been allowed by other conductors to
us&the coupons, not only for miles in New
York, but for miles outside of New York,
when the continuous journey was not in
New York. This did not tmake the refusal
of a more intelligent or alert conductor to
accept coupons under similar circumstances impropier. Beebe v. Ayres, 28
Barb. 278 ; Dietrich v. Pa. It. R , 71 Pa.
432. The plaintiff was uot misled to his
hurt, by the conduct of the other conductors. That they permitted him to obtain
a ride to which he had no right, surely did
not give hin a right to obtain another.
Although we do not pursue the path
adopted by the learned trial court, we are
satisfied that the result reached by it, is
eorrect.
Judgment affirmed.
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JAMES ANDERSON vs. JACOB
DAVIS.
Bight to alien dower-When it may be
aliened.
Bill in equity for assignment of dower.
MEARKLE & SHELENBERGER for plaintiff
1. Married women can dispose of property, real, personal or mixed, either in
possession or expectancy. Penna. Statute
June 3 1893, McConnell v. Linsey, 131 Pa.
489; Hays v. Leonard, 155 Pa. 474.
2. Married women may assign dcwer
right. Pope v. Meade, 99 N. Y. 201;
Thompson v. London, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 444.
3. The slightest interest in land may be
sold. Humphrey v. Humphrey, 1 Yeates
429.
WALLACE & COLLINS for defendant.
1. During coverture dower is a mere contingent expectancy and not a vested estate.
Thompson v. Morron, 5 S. & K. 289; Kennedy v. Wedson, I Dallas 415.
2. Statute of June 1893, does not give
a married woman a right to release
,%idow's dower to a stranger even though
husband joins with her in release, unless it
is coupled with husband's interest and
released to his grantee. Such a transaction
would defeat the very purpose of this provision and would be contrary to policy of
the law. Boyer v. Commonwealth 40 Pa.
37: White v. Wages 25 N. Y. 333; McConnell v. Lindsay, 131 Pa. 476.
3. Conveyance by a married woman
during husband's life of her dower right
is void and does not estop her from maintaining a writ of dower against the grantee
after husband's death. If such conveyance is void at law it cannot operate in
equity. Mason v. Mason, 140 Mass. 63;
Gibson v. Gibson, 15 Mass. 106.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

John Kendall conveyed a farm to Davis,
his wife not joining in the deed, nor otherwise releasing to Davis her dower. A year
afterwards, Kendall being very ill, and
about to die, he and his wife made a deed
for her interests in his land as dowress, to
James Anderson, who paid her $2000. Six
weeks afterwards, Kendall died. Anderson now files this bill in equity to have the
dower assigned to him.
OPINION OF LANDIS,

J.

The question arising in this case, is
whether a dower interest accruing to a
married woman prior to her husband's
death, in the real estate of her husband, by
virtue of the marriage, is assignable, and
we think it is not.

The doctrine seems to be well and almost universally settled, that until assignment, the dower right is merely inchoate.
Although she may release the right to the
owner of the fee, she can make no other
disposition of it until set apart to, or admeasured to her. It is a personal right
which lies only in action, and not in grant,
before it is assigned to her. It is said that
the position of the dowress before the assignment is very peculiar. During this
period, .from the date of marriage till the
date of assignment, her situation is an
anomalous case, standing on its own peculiar circumstances, and neither borrowing
nor offering any analogies. It is probably
the only existing case in which a title, the
complete and unopposed by any adverse
righr of possession, does not confer on the
person in whom it is vested, the right of
reducing it to possession by entry. The
situation of a dowress has no resemblance
to that of a person who has become entitled to a particular estate by way of remainder or springing use; she has no
seizin in law, nor can she exercise any act
of ownership before assignment. Park on
Dower, p. 334.
In forming an opinion on this question
we are compelled to consider dower righL
as a right separate from and not controlled
by the rules usually applicable to those
rights of the nature of which dower seems
to smack.
Some peculiarities need to be pointed
out to lead us to a determination in this
case.
1. The right of dower may be defeated,
modified or changed by the Legislature.
Barbour v. Barbour, 46 Me. 9; Melitez
Appl. 17 Pa. 449.
2. The inchoate right of dower before
the husband's death is wholly divested
when land is taken forpublic uses and the
owner paid. It is not such a vested interest in his wife as to remain outstanding,
and to ripen into an estate in default of
compensation to her. Moore v. New York,
8 N. Y. 110.
3. A sale under an act "to provide for
the partition of real estate" of an estate
held in common, divests the wife of a cotenant in fee of the estate of her inchoate
right of dower therein, and passes the entire estate to the purchaser. Weaver v.
Gregg, 6 Ohio 547.

THE FORUM.
4. A married woman cannot protect
her dower interest from waste or deterioration by her husband or his alienee.
Washburn-on Real Property, Vol. 1. 3 Ed.
p. 301.
An estate whose existence is so precarious as that of dower right seems to be, we
do not deem to be such al estate as lies
within the power of alienation.
The interest of the wife in her dower
cannot be sold on execution for her debts
nor call it in any way be attached. Gooch
v. Atkins, 14 Mass. 378. This at once displays an unusual and unique circumstances for has the wife not something of
value and then not of value just as the
whim to convey or to retain is entertained?
A case in 32 Maine 427 holds that. a conveyance by a married woman, before the
death of her husband, of her dower right,
except to a party in pos*ession or in privity
of the estate, from which it accrued, is
without effect. In this case the point involved in the case at bar is squarely met
and as squarely decided.
Some claim to the right of a married
woman to convey her dower interest might
be obtained from the fact that the law allows the wife to join in the husband's deed
of conveyance. But this is only for the
purpose of estopping her from claiming
her dower after her husband's death, and
not for the purpose of conveying any supposed interest that she might possess in
the property. 21 Me. 156 ; 8 Pick. 532; 18
Pick. 9.
The law has looked with disfavor upon
conveyances of the exemption and homestead interests both of which approximate
in character and object to the right of
dower. 4 District Rep. Pa. 550; Odenwelder's Estate; Gummison v. Twitchel,
38 N. H. 68.
To further support our holding in this
case we need but to consider the position
of Jacob Davis, the tenant in possession at
the time of the husband's death, in case
the widow demanded of him an assignment
of her dower. A release of dower to a
stranger cannot be set up as a bar to her
claim against the tenant of the estate.
Washburn on Real Property, Vol. I, p. 247,
Harrinman v. Gray, 49 Maine 537; Pixley
v. Bennet, 11 Mass. 298. Would he then

not be compelled to assign to her the dower
in spite of what disposition she had made
of it prior to her husband's death? After
lie had assigned to the widow should he
then be compelled to make a second assignment to James Anderson, the party
holding the widow's conveyance for her
dower right? We do not hold him so
liable. To do this would be al affront to
the spirit of our laws and an insult to the
principles of justice.
If Anderson has any remedy, and we
think he has, it must be against the
widow, on the covenants contained in the
deed of conveyance of the dower right,
which conveyance we deem a mere executory contract calling for the future transfer of this right of dower, i. e. after it has
been assigned to the widow.
An assignment of an expectancy may be
enforced as al executory agreement to
convey. Fritz Est., 160 Pa. 156; Bayler v.
Coin., 40 Pa. 37; Power's Appl., 63 Pa. 443.
The plaintiff's counsel claim that by
virtue of theActof June3, 1893, providing
that married women can convey any property of any.kind, real, personal or mixed,
and either in possession or expectancy the
same as anyfeme sole has the power to do.
We hold that a married woman acquires
no right from this Act by which she is
invested with the power to convey her
dower interest. In Odenwelder's Estate, 4
Pa. District Rep. 550, this act is construed
to confer on married women only the
rights and powers of unmarried persons,
and the exercises of these rights and
powers is limited to "the same extent" by
married women as by unmarried persons.
Now al unmarried woman can have no
inchoate right in a husband's estate and
can exercise no powers over such right.
In White v. Wagner, 25 N. Y. 328, thesame
construction was put upon an Act enabling married women to convey and devise real estate and personal property. The
court holding that "No doubt there was
an intention to confer upon the wife the
legal capacity of afeme sole, in respect to
conveyances of her property, but this does
not prove that she can convey to her hiusband (tile point in question in the case)
for no such question could possibly arise
in respect to a feme sole.
Demurrer sustained, and bill dismissed.
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OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

A wife acquires, as soon as her husband
becomes owner in fee of land, an interest
in it. She is not like an heir. The heir
has no species of estate in, or lien upon the
ancestors' land. He has no rights with respect to it which the courts recognize.
The ancestor may grant it during life or
devise it at death without the heir's consent. Not sowith dower. Thehusband's
grant or devise of the land, does not detach
it therefrom. In England and in perhaps
most of the American states, the dower
avails against the husband's debts. As he
cannot directly withdraw his land from the
widow's claim, neither can he indirectly
by contracting debts. It is anomolous
perhaps, that in Pennsylvania, debts are
superior to dower. A sale on a judgment,
Directors of Poor v. Royer, 43 Pa. 146; or
mortgage, Scott v. Crosdale, 2 Dall. 127;
or, under a testamentary power, Mitchell
v. Mitchell, 8 Pa. 126, or the order of the
Orphans' Court, for the payment of debts,
will discharge the dower. An assignment
voluntary or in bankruptcy, or in insolvency, will not have this effect.
It is unimportant to classify the kind of
interest which the wife has. The courts
will protect it, even before the husband's
death. Clifford v.Kampfe, 147 N. Y. 383;
Flynn v. Flynn, 171 Mass. 312; Davis v.
Wetherill, 13 Allen 60. The decisions are
not uniform as to whether it is a vested or a
contingent interest, most atirmning that it
is contingent. It is difficult to see why it
should not be called vested. That a sherifPs
sale on judgments will divest it, does not
show that it is contingent.
That the
death of the wife before the husband will
prevent its enjoyment, no more makes it
contingent than the possibility of the
death before A of B to whom a remainder
for life, after the death of A, is granted,
would make the remainder contingent.
Contingent interests are alienable. It is
"the rule in equity that an assignment intended to be made of a possibility for a
valuable consideration, should be decreed
to be carried into effect." Williams Real
Property 336 (17th Ed.) A conveyance of
a contingent remainder operates as an estoppel, "whenever the remainder becomes
vested, and the estoppel becomes an estate
in interest" 2 Washb. Real Prop. 591.
Were then the wife's dower contingent, it

might still bealienable. Indeed, it has been
alienable for centuries, by fine in England,
by joinder in the husband's conveyance
with separate acknowledgment in Pennsylvania.
The wife's dower is more than an expectancy, like the heir's; yet a child's conveyance of what he hopes to get by de-

scent or devise, is in equity valid, if for a
consideration. Bayler v. Commonwealth,
40 Pa. 37; Fritz's Estate, 160 Pa. 156; Lennig's Estate, 182 Pa. 485; Kuhn's Estate,
163 Pa. 438; Patterson v. Caldwell, 124 Pa.
455; East Lewisburg Lumber Co. v. Marsh,
91 Pa. 96. As Green J., remarks, "Almost
every form of property or right, whether
in esse or posse, is assignable." Day v.
New England Life Ins. Co., 111 Pa. 607.
It would follow afortiori that a contingent interest, which is more than an expectancy, is assignable.
That a dower right may be aliened after
the death of the husband, but before the
setting apart of any portion of the premises, is well settled. Payne v. Becker, 87
N. Y. 153; Pope v. Mead, 99 N. Y. 201;
Wilson v. Ott, 160 Pa. 435. The alienee
may take the measures which the widow
could have taken, to have the dower set
apart. What change has the husband's
death wrought? Only these. If the dower
was contingent before, it has now become
absolute; and the husband is no more.
Thesedifferences ought not to affect the
wife's power to aliene her interest.
It has been held, in some jurisdictions,
that the wife can aliene her dower only to
her husband's grantee, and by release.
Marvin v. Smith, 46 N. Y. 571; Mason v.
Mason, 140 .Mass. 63; Johnson v. Shields,
32 Mle. 424. There might possibly be some
reason for forbidding the wife to convey
the dower before the husband has aliened
the fee. After he has aliened the fee,
without the release of the dower, we
are unable to realize why with the consent of the husband, manifested by his
joining in the deed, she may not transfer
her dower to whom she chooses. It would
hardly be contended that she could not
then transfer it to the previous grantee of
the land. Mrs. Kendall had found a purchaser willing to pay $2000 for her dower.
Had she been compelled to sell it, if she
sold it at all, to Josiah Davis, she might
not have been able to get $1000 for it

THE 1PORU1.
Davis might have declined to buy it at any
price, speculating on the possibility of her
death before-ber husband.
If Mrs. Kendall's deed to Anderson could
not operate at law for any reason, it will
be treated, in equity, as a covenant to convey. Such covenants by married women,
are specifically enforceable. Reed's Estate, 3 District, R. 503. Whitlinger v.
Jack, 16 Pa. C. C. 112; Bauck v. Swan, 146
Pa. 444. Equity in this State, will regard
that as done which ought to have been
done, and the right of Anderson is precisely the same as if Mrs. Kendall had,
since her husband's death, conveyed the
dower interest to him. The learned court
below erred, we think, in postponing this
hypothetical conveyance from the widow
until the dower had been actually assigned.
Decree reversed, and bill reinstated.

cover the use of the cow while in defendant's possession. Taylor v. Morgan, 3
Watts 335; Lyon v. Gormly, 53 Pa. 261.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Ferris took possession of two cows belonging to Bogardus and refused, on the
demand of the latter, to return them,
claiming them as his own. Six months
afterwards he offered to return them, but
Bogardus refused to receive one, which
had been hurt while in Ferris' possession,
but without his fault. The other cow Bogardus took back. The latter was worth
$40 and the former $60. This action is
trespass for the taking and conversion of
the cows.
CHA-RGE OF COURT.

That Ferris has been guilty of a conversion of Bogardus' cows is not controverted.
He took them, and despite the demand for
JOHN BOGARDUS vs. SAMUEL
their return, refused to return them. He
claimed them, it is true, as his own, but
PENIS.
the opinion that they were his, however
sincere, did not make the appropriation
1respass for conversion.
any the less a conversi'n ; Webb's Pollock
GEO. W. AUBREY and WENCEL HART- Torts, 435; 2 Jaggard Torts, 720; 2(; Am.
MAN, attorneys for plaintiff.
and Eng. Ency. 737.
Six months after the taking of the cows,
For every invasion, violation or infringement of a legal right the law implies damFerris offered to return them. This offer
age. Williams v. Esling, 4 Pa. 486; Repke
even had it been accepted could not oblitv. Sergeant, 7 W. & S. 9; defendant canerate the already consummated convernot exonerate himself from liability for the
sion, nor the right of Bogardus to an acsixty dollar cow by proof that it was injured without his fault.
Perham v.
tion, 2 Jaggard 721. The act of depriving
Coney, 117 Mass. 102; Spooner v. ManchesBogardus of his possession for six months
ter, 133 Mass. 270; nor can he mitigate
was a wrong which could not be expunged
damages by offbring to return the cow.
by the the restoration of the cows after that
Brew:ster v. Sillman 38 N. Y. 4234; Hanner v. Wilsey, 17 Wend. 491; hence plainperiod. Whitaker v. Houghton, 86 Pa.
tiff is entitled to recover value of injured
48.
cow and damages from the time lie was
Bogardus accepted the uninjured cow.
deprived of its possession, plus damages
He could not therefore fairly insist while
for detention of forty dollar cow. Ehrgott
v. Mayor, 96 N. Y. 264; Griffin v. Colow,
keeping it, on recovering its value. 86 Pa.
16 N. Y. 4s9.
48. He would have a right to coipensaJ. G. MxrnMER and FRED OILER for detion for the loss of it during the six months
fendant.
but for naught more. He refused to take
Only inmimal damages can le recovered
back the injured cow. Was he bound to
when a tort-feasorh:is delivered converted
receiveit? Wethinknot. One whocompersonal property to rightful owner, and
if received by rightful owner, it goes in
mits a conversion assumes the risk of being
mitigation of damages. Amer. & Eng.
compelled to pay to the owner the full
Enc. of Law, Vol. 4, p. 125; Sparks v.
value in money of the chattel. Theowner
Purdy, I I Mo. 219. If property is injured
probably need not receive it back even
while in possession of the tort-fiasor and
no evidence to show to what extent the
though it be in the state il which it was
injury has been sustained by the plaintiff" when taken.
He certainly is not bound
only nominal damages can be given. Suds
to take it back if it has suffered deteriorav. Metropolitan Gaslight Co., 90 N. Y. 26.
tion. 86 Pa. 48. Ferris must pay to BoIf on other hand plaintiff recovers value
and interest of injured cow, he cannot regardus the value of the injured cow at the
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time of the conversion with interest from
that date to the present time. 2 Sedgwick
Damages 79.
The plaintiff has a right to compensation for the detention of the uninjured
cow during the period of six months. He
has however, furnished no standard by
which the compensation could be estimated other than the value of the cow.
The cow was worth $60. It is possible
that during the six months of its detention, it yielded more than the interest on
$60, or less Its keep would cost something.
Whether it in fact yielded milk and butter, or otherwise compensated for the fodder consumed by it, and the care bestowed
on it, does not appear. We think however, that the jury may assume prima
facie, that it was worth to its possessor,
the interest on its value for the time. In
case of the return of a chattel after con ver-*
sion says Sedgwick, "the measure of dam
ages is not the whole value of the property
but compensation for the injury done to
the property, which would usually be interest on the value of the property while
it was withheld from the plaintiff, together with the deterioration in its
market value." 2 Damages, 75; Anderson
v. Sloane, 72 Wis. 566. Whether the thing
be animate or inanimate, it must often
happen that the possession of it for a certain
period of time would have been of no
pecuniary advantage. If money were
tortiously taken and kept for a year, and
then returned, the owner could doubtless
recover as damages the legal interest,
although had he not been deprived of it,
he would have found no profitable use for
it. If the cow had not been taken from
Bogardus, he might have made nothing
or much from it above the cost of its
keep. We think he would be entitled, at
all event, to the interest on its value, in
the absence of other evidence. If Ferris
desired to take advantage of the fact, if
fact it be, that the cow was of no profit,
the burden was upon him to show it.
Borgardus is therefore entitled to $1.20 for
the detention of the cow that was returned. For the other, he is entitled to
$60 plus interest from the time of the conversion. Your verdict therefore, gentlemen of thejury, will be in accordance with
this instruction.

JOHN HIPPLE vs. CHARLES ATTERBURY.
-Notegivenfor abandonments of criminal
proceedings-suppressionofprosecutions
-Fase pretense- Compounding ofpro.ecution.
DEVALL and PRINCE for plaintiff.
1. A note given in settlement of a prosecution for obtaining money by false pretence is not invalid, Rothermnel v. Hughes,
134 P. L. 510.
2. A note given for the abandonment of
criminal proceedings, for misdemeanor
which chiefly affect the individual aggrieved, is valid.
Obtaining money by false pretense is
such a misdemeanor. Grier v. Shade, 109
P. S. 180.

'3. The compounding of a prosecution
for ubtaining money by false pretense is
not forbidden by law, and a note given
on such a consideration is valid. Steinbaker v. Wilson, I Leg. Gaz. R. 76.
VALE and HUBER for defendant.

1. Tabert was guilty of a crime. The
consideration is illegal, hence payment
cannot be enforced on the mortgage.
2. It is to the interest of the publicthat
the suppression of a prosecution should
not be made a matter of bargain. McMahon v. Smith, 47 Com. 221; Ormerod
v. Dearman, 90 Pa. 49; National bank Oxfork v. Kirk, 100 Pa. 561.
3. The statute-Purd. 1410, See. 1561
does not apply to this case, because its provisions have not been complied with.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

William Talbot, a dealer in paintings,
sold a picture to Hippie, representing it to
be by Titian, and obtained for it from
IHil)ple, who was rich but ignorant of art,
$1000. The picture was worth $75. Hipple, on learning of the frAud upon him,
made an information against Talbot for
obtaining money from him by false pretense. Talbot induced his wife's father,
Charles Atterbury, to give Aug. 3, 1895,
a mortgage on his house for $1000 to Hipple, payable 2 years after date, if Hipple
would agree not further to press the prosecation. Hippie agreed, and induced the
District Attorney to present no bill to the
grand jury, and the mortgage was executed and delivered. This sci. fa. is sued
out, Nov. 17, 1898, to compel payment.OPINION OF THE COURT.

The law gives to Hipple a civil remedy
for the fraud committed upon him by
Talbot, in the sale of the picture. It was
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competent for them to agree for a period of
delay, and to secure by mortgage the sum
ascertained to represent the damages, at.
the expiration of two years. The objection
to a recovery oil the mortgage is that Hippie having made a criminal information
against Talbot, Atterbury, his father-inlaw, gave the mortgage in consideration of
Hippie's agreeing not further to press the
prosecution.
Contracts for the compounding of
crimes, are generally disapproved by the
law. Brown v. McCreight, 187 Pa. 181;
Geir v. Shade, 109 Pa. 180. To compound
murder, manslaughter, rape, sodomy, arson
or forgery, bribery, perjury, etc., is made
criminal. Section 10, Act March 31st,
1860; 1 P. & L. 1149. The crime of false
pretense is not in the catalogue. The 9th
section of the same act, 1 P. & L. 1410,
authorizes the settlement of a misdeineanor which is (1) to.the damage of tie
party complaining, (2) not done with the.
intent to commit a felony, (3) not infamous, and (4) for which there is a remedy
by action. Obtaining money by false pretense is a crime of this class. Geir v.
Shade, 109 Pa. 180; Rothermal v. Heiges,
134 Pa. 510. By this act t l public interest
is so far subordinated to the private, that
the magistrate may, on the request of the
prosecutor, discharge the prisoner, or the
court may order a nolle prosequi to be entered. The magistrate or the court is
moved by tile appearance before hi or it,
of the prosecutor, and by his acknowledgnient "to have received satisfaction'" for
the injury. The satisfaction may precedi'
the appearance and acknowledgment. It
may consist in money or other property
delivered, or, as in the case before us, of a
note or a mortgage securing a future paynient.
The defendant contends that the agreement ought to have been, on Hipple's part,
to appear before the court and make the
acknowledgment in order that the court
might order the nolleprosequi. It. does not
appear as we think it should whether such
was in fact the agreement. It is not the
policy of the act of March ]3th, 1860, to
permit the parties by a secret agreement
to prevent investigation into crime. The
case must be brought to the notice of the
nmagistrate or court. If lie decides that it
shall, notwithstanding the agreement, he

prosecuted, it must be carried forward to
trial and judgment. The prosecutor would
have no right, on account of his private
contract, to withhold his testimony.
It does not appear that Hipple agreed to
do more than secretly to desist from pressing the prosecution. Nor did he in fact
go before the court and obtain its judgment
as to the propriety of abstaining from urging the case to trial. Failure to do so, was
held in Massachusetts under a similar
statute, to avoid the compromise. Partridge
v. Hood, 120 Mass. 403.
We instruct you therefore, gentlemen of
the jury, that upon the evidence before
you, your verdict must be for the defendant.
WILLIAM HANLIN vs. ARTHUR
BRANDON.
.T. B. LAVENS and W. E. SHEAFFER
attorneys for the plaintiff.
1. The agreement was made for the purpose of stifling a criminal prosecution
which is in violation of the Act of Assemnbly of 1860. Pearce v. Wilson, III Pa. 24;
Riddle v. Hall, 99 Pa. 116.
2. There was no consideration for the
contract. National Bank of Oxford v.
Kirk, 90 Pa. 49; Commonwealth v. Slatterly, 140 Mass. 423.
JAMFES OIKEEFE and H. M. BROOKS
attorneys for the defendant.
1. An agreement to stifle a criminal
prosecution is illegal. Clark on Contracts.
p. 428. If a contract has been entered
into for an illegal purpose and has
been executed the courts will not undo
the contract and the party aggrieved must
suffer the loss of his own illegal acts.Trace v. Boyer, 6 Casey 99; Lestepics v.
Ingraam, 5 Pa. 71; Shane v. Scott, 11
S. & R. 163; Peters et. al. v. Grim, 149 Pa.
163; Shannon v. Shuman, 27 Pa. 90.
STATEMIENT OF THE CASE.

In 1895 John Hanlin, the son of the
plaintiff, forged certain checks of the defendant, amounting to $500. The father
in order to keep the matter quiet, and to
prevent .a prosecution against his son,
agreed with the defendant that he would
deed his property worth $5000, if lie would
not prosecute. In accordance with this
agreement he transferred property to
Brandon to that value in the Borough of
Carlisle.
Subsequently Brandon discovered that
another check had been forged and
cashed. Thereupon lie had John Hanlin

THE FORUM
arrested and convicted of forgery. William
Hanlin therefore demanded that the
agreement be rescinded, and the property
reconveyed. He brings this action to compel Brandon so to do.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The 10th action of the Act of March 31,
1860, 1 P. & L. 1148, declares guilty of a
misdemeanor any person who having
knowledge of any "misprision of treason,
* * * forgery * * * shall take money,
goods, chattels, lands or other reward or
promise thereof, to compound or conceal,
or upon agreement to compound or conceal it." 'William Hanlin promised to
convey and conveyed his land to Arthur
Brandon, for the purpose of compounding
and concealing the forgery of his son.
Brandon was guilty therefore of a misdemeanor, in receiving the promise and the
execution of it. The agreement to convey
was unenforceable. Pearce v. Wilson, 1ll
Pit. 24 ; Riddle v. Hall, 99 Pa. 116; Nat.
Bank v. Kirk, 90 Pa. 49 ; Bredin's Appeal,
92 Pa. 241. Had Hanlin refused to carry
out his contract, the courts would not
have aided Brandon by compelling him to
do so; or by giving Brandon danmages. 1i.r
turpi causa non o)itur actio.
But, Hanlin lras himself carried out the
contract. He need not have done so. No
legal duty constrained him. But as he
has done so, he is not now permitted, on
repenting of his compliance with his
promise, to recover the land. The illegality of the executed contract, is no ground
for the court's annunment of its execution,
and compulsion of the return of the
consideration. The status of the parties, after performance of the contract is what it would have been,
had the contract been innocent.
A
sale of mules, with delivery thereof, ou
Sunday, passes the ownership to the vendee; Chestnut v. Harbaugh, 78 Pa. 473;
Mlyers v. Meinrath, 101 Mass. 366. Whatever the nature of the illegality, the executed contract is irrepealable.
Lestapies
v. Ingralant, 5 Pa. 71; Hipple v. Rice, 28
Pa. 406; Fox v. Cash, I1 Pa. 212; Slmumnan
v. Shuman, 27 Pa. 90, Smith v. l-laninerer, 1.52 Pa. 98; 6 Am. & EnIg. Encyc.
415 (2d Ed.) Hence, if money be paid, or
other property transferred, in order to
suppress the prosecution of a felony, it

cannot be recovered back; Connell v. Walton, 6 Kulp. 4.51; Haynes v. Rudd, 102 N.
Y. 372; 83 N. Y. 253.
The plaintiff however, urges that he executed the conveyance under duress to
Brandon. The presence of duress vitiates
not only an executory butalso all executed
contract. Personalty or realty transferred
under its influence, may be recovered
back. Filhnan v. Ryon, 168 Pa. 484. Did
then, Hanlin convey the land in question
under duress? Williani Hanlin's son
forged certain checks. He thus became
liable to )rosecution. So far as appears,
William Hanlin applied to Brandon, in
order to prevent the prosecution. Brandin
did not agree to refrain from prosecuting,
until lie obtained from Hanilin the promise to convey the land. He had a right
to l)rosecute. It was, apparently, his social and moral duty to prosecute. The law,
at least, frowns on his abstaining from
prosecution in consideration of any promise. It is difficult to see how the purpose
of doing that which one properly may and
ought to do, until diverted front it by X,
can be said to be a duress on X with respect to the act by which he effects the
diversion. The decisions, however, are
far from harmonious; Clark Cont. 360. In
Stouffer v. Latshaw, 2. W. 165, an arrest
for at lroper cause was not duress as
regards a note given to escape it. A bond
given while in jail, by one charged with
bastardy, is not though given to procure
enlargement, voidable. Pflaum v. lcClintock, 130 Pa. 369; nor is a bond for the
support of A's wife, procured by a threat
to arrest him for adultery, Hamilton v.
Lockhart, 158 Pa. 452.
On the other hand, it has been held that
if B. from whonm A. has embezzled money,
employs the power to prosecute for the
purpose of extorting from A. -a much
larger sum than that which was embezzled, the act is onie of duress, and the
money paid by A. can be recovered back.
Fillman v. Ryon, 168 Pa. 484. The evidence that Brandon employed his power
to prosecute for this purpose is not very
strong. The forged checks were for $500.
The property received by Brandon, to
stifle the prosecution, was worth $,-,5000.
Perhaps this would justify thejury in concluding, as it did, that Hanlin was under
duress.
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It is to be remembered, however, that
Hanlin's object was illegal. The contract
he made was illegal. Brandon committed
a misdemeanor in entering into it. The
question, then, is, may A who illegally
induces B to refrain from prosecuting a
crime, by offering him a bribe, recover the
bribe, on the allegation that his inability
to escape the prosecution otherwise, was a
coercion? Hanlin could properly hope
and wish and beseech that Brandon would
not prosecute. Brandon's refusal to abstain, could in no sense be called duress.
Nor would it become duress because it was
capable of being subdued, and was in fact
subdued only by a bribe. But, even if
these last facts form duress, we think that
the illegal motive of Hanlin so combines
with the duress as to deprive him of all
right to redress on account of the l.itter.
In Haynes v. Rudd, 102 N. Y. 372, it is
held that in such a case, duress cannot be
alleged to obtain the restitution of the
bribe paid. Unfortunately, the court does
not consider in Fillman v. Ryon, 168 Pa.
484, the effect of the illegal conduct of the
plaintiff upon his right to recover. Fillman was an embezzler. He paid to Ryon
whom he had defrauded, ten times as
much as he had embezzled. He was permitted to recover back WYhat he thus paid,
but the court does not advert to his payment being an illegal act.
It would be against public policy to hold
that one justly accused of a crime might
bribe the wronged person not to p osecute
him, and then get the aid of the courts to
recover back the bribe. Nor would it conduce to good morals, to examine into the
size of the bribe, and to allow a recovery
of it when, in the court's opinion, it was
exorbitant. It is bad enough for A to commit the crime. It would be worse, to allow
him after, the injured person dissuading
from punishing him to get back the consideration. We are not prepared to say
that similar principles should not apply
to interventions by friends of the accused
to procure his exemption from punishnient. The plaintiff having recovered
under erroneous directions of the court, a
new trial is allowed.

JAMES BRIOR vs. BOROUGH OF
DORRANCE.
Eminent Domain-Descriptionin deedGrowing crops- Damages-Highway's
Erroneousboundarj line.
MERKEL LANDIS and THos. M. McCACHRAN for plaintiff.

At time of sale, vendor was undisputed
owner of the rectangle from which part
in the controversy was taken. Although
it was mistakenly laid out he was estopped
from claiming title thereto and McCormick obtained a good title. Willis v.
Swartz, 28 Pa. 413. Land owner who
holds deed and is is in possession is to be
considered owner of the property. Western avenue, Downington, 7 0. C. 233.
Damages are to be ascertained from
opening or widening of the street. Losch's
appeal, 109 Pa. 72; Borough of Easton, 116
Pa. 1; Whitaker v. Phoenixville, 141 Pa.
327.
Borough is a trespasser. Constitution
of Pa. Art. XVI .8; Act of Apr. 22, 1856,
Ph. 525 1; Trickett on Road Law, 635.
Plaintiff entitled to valueof crops. Gilmore v. R. R. Co., 104 Pa. 27,5.
Interest should be allowed from time of
-taking the land. Weiss v. So. Bethin,
136 Pa. 294.
FRANK B. SELLERS, Jr., and A. FRANK
OiN for defendant.
Brior must show his title to the land.
His position as second purchaser does not
alter the case. Brewer v. R. R. Co., 48
I ass. 479.
An erroneous line agreed on by mistake
when the true line is not uncertain does
not bind the parties. Am & Eng. Encyc.
2d End. Vol. IV, 862; Washburn v. Real
Property, 4th Ed. 86; Waterman on Trespass, 114; Davis v. Russel, 142 Pa. 426.
Measure of damage is the value of the
property immediately before and immediately after opening of the street. Trickett
Boro. Law, Vol. 1, 286.
Interest not recoverable: not within
contemplation of the act of 1851 P1. 326.
Keager v. R. R. Co., 160 Pa. 386; Becker v.
R. R. Co., 177 Pa. 252.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

In 1883, Thomas Powell owned land,
rectangular in shape, (20 Yods by 30 rods),
situate in the township of Miles. One of
the shorter sides of the rectangle being a
part of the western boundary of Dorrance
Borough, and perpendicular, near its middle point, to Main street of the Borough.
In 1887, Powell conveyed to James McCormick "a piece of land described as follows: Beginning at a point formerly a
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stone corner (the corner of lands of N.
Morton, A. Jenkins, and M. Marley);
thence west 65 feet to land of Thos. Powell;
thence south 150 feet, thence east 65 feet,
thence north 150 feet to beginning."
The stone corner, or point, formed the

the northeast corner of the rectangle.
There was no monument there atthe time
of the conveyance. Powell took McCormick upon the land and laid out the part
lie intended to convey, beginning measurements at a point which he fixed as the
corner of the rectangle or the JenkinsMorton-Marley stake. McCormick built
a fence around his lot and erected houses
thereon; one at the" north boundary and
one near the southwestern corner.
In 1890, upon petition, viewers were appointed and from the western terminus of
lain street of the Borough, a 30 ft. wide
street or road was laid out, extending
westward 400 yards to the other terminus.
The viewer's reported, at that time, "the
northern boundary of the road to be in the
same course as the northern boundary of
Main street of the Borough, etc."
This line ran parallel to southern boundary of McCormick's land, and 10 feet
north of said boundary, taking the porch
off his house. McCormick, residing upon
the premises had no knowledge of his
property being included in the proposed
road. The viewers awarded damages only
to Powell. The township supervisors, in
fact, so laid it out, that the southern
boundary or fence inclosing the lot formed
the north line of the road (20 feet wide as
actually laid out).
In 1893, McCormick conveyed to John
Brior what Powell had conveyed to him,
McCormick, using the same description in
his deed as that contained in the Powell
deed. On June3, 1898, land west of the Borough having previously been annexed
thereto, the Borough Council passed a
resolution idirecting the Street Commissioner to widen Alain street along the
Brior property, to conform to a recent survey mnide by the borough surveyor, who
found the Jenkins-Morton- Marley stake to
be 10 feet north from the northeast cornerpost of Brior's fence, also making the
northern line of the street as indidated in
the viewer's report.
The Street Commissioner on July 1, 1898,
took the porch off Brior's house and moved

in his southern fence ten feet. The house
cost Brior $3000. The porch cost $150.
Land in'that vicinity is worth, or selling
at $25 per .foot front. The south side of
the house, without porch, is on the street
line, exclusive of side-walk. The land
taken not occupied by the house, had
thereon a growing crop worth $2.5.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

In. 1887 Powell owned a tract of land
bounded by lines, two of which ended at
a corner made by lands of Morton, Jenkins and Marley. From this tract he intended to sell a portion bounded by these
two lines, beginning at the corner, and extending, one 150 feet and the other 65 feet.
The other two lines were opposite and
parallel to these, respectively.
Powell
went on the ground and selecting a spot
on the eastern line of the lot which was in
fact 10 feet from the corner intended, but
which he assumed to be that corner, he
marked on the ground the part of land
which he intended to convey. A deed was
made, which described the land as
bounded by a line beginning at'the Morton
Jenkins and Marley corner, and thence
extending west 65 feet, etc. It is evident
then. that the land actually mArked oft
overlaps to the south a strip 10 feet wide,
and excludes on the north, a strip of the
same width, which had the parties made
no mistake, would have been respectively
excluded undincluded. Whoseare these
strips?
When land is indicated "by the vendor,
by objects or marks upon or near it, and
he sells it thus indicated, niaking a deed
which is accepted by the vendee as a
conveyance of it, the deed will be deemed
a conveyance of it, although the description therein does not apply to it. Marks
on the ground prevail over adjoiners
courses, and distances. Roos v. Connell,
7 Kulp, 113; Burkholder v. Markley, 98
Pa. 37; Lodge v. Barnett, 46 Pa. 477;
Willis v. Swartz, 28 Pa. 413. The parties
intended, the one to sell and the other to
buy, the land marked. It matters not that
this intention was produced by a mistake
for which the vendor was responsible. The
precise land marked off by Powell lie
would not have sold, had lie known that
the point assumned by him to be the Morton corner was not in fact such. Nevertlhe-
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less lie did intend to sell what he sold, and
the vendor intended to buy what he
bought, ignorant of Powell's mistake.
Without McCormick's consent, he cannot be deprived of the land which lie
in fact purchased.
It appears, again, that secure in his
ownership, McCormick has erected a house
on the southwest corner of the lot, so near
to the south line thereof, that if that line
should be shifted ten feet northward, the
porch of the house would be lost. The loss
that would. arise, from a change of the location of the boundaries, the buildings
having been put up in reliance on tie
representations of the vendor, would estop
the latter from insisting on a translation of
the vendee to land with other boundaries.
Willis v. Swartz, 28 Pa. 413; Roos v. Connelly, 7 Culp 113.
The plaintiff has contended that, even
if McCormick had no good title to the ten
feet strip on the south of his lot, the Borough of Dorrance could get no advantage
from that fact. The action is trespass.
The right of the plaintiff in such an action
ordinarily depends on his possession. If
he has possession, one who invades it is
liable, however defective his title may be.
If the object of this action was to recover
damages arising from the trespass down to
the bringing of the action, the value of the
crop destroyed, the injur.v to the house,
it is clear that the trespasser could not
challenge the rights of the plaintifi But,
lie is seeking also to obtain compensation
for the permanent future deprivation of
land, and the injury to the premisesarising
from such deprivation. Western Avenue,
Downington, 7 Pa. C. C. 233, is not authority for the doctrine that in trespass, resorted
to to obtain damages for a permanent easement, tile defendant cannot contest the
title of the plaintiff. We think lie cai.
The land in question was in a township
adjacent to the borough of Dorrance. Uijder the road law, viewers were in 18U0 appointed to make a road 30 fpet wide and
400 yards long, continuous with the main
street in the borough. The road was laid
out, its north line coinciding with what
would have been the south line of the McCormick tract, had the mistake concerning
the Morton, Jenkins and Morley corner
not been made. -Nodamages were awarded
to McCormick. The act of Feb. 24, 1845,

applicable to Luzerne county, requires that
public notice be given by the viewers, in
the vicinity of the proposed route. It does
not appear that this notice was not given.
Nor does it seem that McCormick was ignorant of the proceeding. He resided on
the premises. He had it is true no
knowledge that his property was "being
included in the proposed road" but that
may have been the result of his negligence
in making inquiries. He should, if discontented with the report of the viewers,
have obtained a review. On the contrary,
he seems to have acquiesced in it, and allowed it to be confirmed. Of. Penn'a Road
Law, 74. We think he is now estopped
from disputing the legality of the appropriation of his land.
The person entitled to damages, is the
owner of the land at the time when the
damages are payable. The damages in
this case, became payable before 1893,
when McCormick conveyed to Brior. 1
Borough Law, 291; Penna. Road Law, 181.
The supervisors opened the road only to
the width of 20 feet, and did not open the
portion embraced within the lines of Brior.
As the right to damages does not depend
on the opening but upon the laying out,
the actual taking of Brior's porch, etc.,
does not constitute a new cause of action.
The road having fallen within the borough by annexation, its council had the
power to open the remaining one-third of
the width of the road, without any proceedings in court for the ascertainment of
damages or for any other purpose.
If any special damage arose from the
opening not inseparable from it, it could
doubtless be recovered in this action. The
crop waa planted in a public road, and the

planter took the risk that it would be destroyed, if the public authorities opened
the road before it had ripened. The evidence-discloses nothing for which the plaintiff is entitled to recover. The verdict was
therefore properly for the defendant. A
new trial is refused.
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COX & BROWN vs. STRONG.

The contractors ordered the lumber and
building material from the lumber firm of
Mechanics lien-Scire .facias issued-M1a- Cox and Brown who commenced deliverterial on credit of building-Notice re- ing lumber upon the premises May 15,
1896, and charged the same to the conquired under Act of 18th May, 1889.
tractors, "Joyce and Roe" on the "Strong
Rule for judgment for.want of sufficient
job" as it is their custom to do.
The building progressed but Mary
affidavit of defense.
Strong failing to meet the payments or
D. EDWARD LONG and B. FRANK FENinstallments when due according to the
TON for the plaintiff.
contract, the contractors refused to com1. The lumber was charged to the
plete the job when it was nearly com"Strong job," which is prima facia sufficient to charge the house.. 1 Trickett on
pleted. The lumber firm of Cox & Brown
Liens 17, 13 ; Kelley v. Brown, 20 Pa. 446;
had delivered lumber and material on the
Barber v. Smith, 38 Pa. 296 Material
job
amounting to $815.62, and fearing
man need not show affirmatively that the
trouble in getting pay served the followmaterials were furnished on the credit of
the building. Hommel v. Lewis, 104 Pa.
ing notice upon Mrs. Mary Strong on July
465.
1,1896:2. The abandonment of the contract.
does not affect the material man's lien.
MRS. MARY STRONG,
Burr v. Mayer, 2Sup. C. 436; Hinchman
Madam :-Please take notice that we inv. Graham, 2 S. & R. 174.
tend to file a lien against your property
3. Notice required by the Act of 18th
located at the corner of Main and CheMay, 1887. 2 P. & L. 2934, ?.27; Swaney
v. Washington, 7 Pa. C. C. 351 ; Strawick
nango streets, for materials furnished for
v. Munhall, 139 Pa. 163; Kelley v. Church,
and about the repairs, alterations of, or
3 Northam 413; Best v. Baumgardner, 122
addition to said building, as provided for
Pa 17; Lucas & Co. v. Ruff, 45 Leg. Int.
by Act of Assembly of May 18, 1887.
154.
Cox & BROWN
L. HILDRFTH and B. JOHNSTON MACEWEN for the defendant.
After notice was served, materials were
I. Where credit is given by a material
delivered at two different dates. Notice
man exclusively to a contractor, and not
and later deliveries took place before the
on the credit of the building for which the
contractors, Joyce and Roe, quit the job
material is furnished, he will not be entitled to a lien. Catanach v. Cassidv, 159
f6r non-payment of installments.
Pa. 474; Barclay v. Wainwright, 86 Pa.
A mechanics' lien was filed December
191 ; Linden Steel Co. v. Refining Co., 146
13, 1896, to No. 2060, January Term, 1897,
Pa. 4; Green v. Thompson, 172 Pa. 609:
against Mrs. Mary Strong, describing her
Weaver v. Sheelar, 124 Pa. 443.
2. Notice was not given at the time of
property, etc.
the furnishing the material as required by
An affidavit of defence to the mechanlaw. Kelley v. Church, 3 Northam 413;
ics' lien was filed February" 23, 1897, as
Strawick v. Munhall, 139 Pa. 1,63; Driebelfollows:
his v. Seayholtz, 8 Pa. C. C. 655.
First. All of the lumber and other maSTATEMENT OF THE CASE.
terials set forth in the plaintiff's stateMary Strong owned a lot in the town of
inent, attached to said mechanics' lien, so
Sussex upon which was a small dwelling.
far as they were sold and delivered at all,
She being desirous of changing the buildwere sold exclusively upon the credit of
ing into a hotel, employed Henry Joyce
said Joyce and Roe and, not upon the
and John Roe, contractors, to enlarge the
credit of said building and appurtenances.
walls upon two sides and raise the roof
Second. Said Joyce and Roe had no
and make such other repairs as were necauthority to act as my agent, as claimed
essary.
in said mechanics' lien, and did not act as
No written specifications or written consuch in any matter relating to such. matract were made between them, but an esterials, etc., set forth in such statement
timate of the cost was given by one of the
attached to said lien.
contractors and he was instructed by Mary
Third. The said notice set forth in said
Strong to go ahead with the work of altermechanics lien was not in accordance with
ation.
the law controlling this case and was not
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served on me at the time that the said
lumber and materials were being furnished, nor until after the time within which
the Act of Assembly of May 18, 1887, and
other laws of the State of Pennsylvania
required such notice to be served.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Under this scire .facias, we are to pass
npon the sufficiency of the affilavit of defence of Mary Strong, the owner. The first
averment is that the materials sold by the
plaintiff were sold exclusively upon the
credit of Joyce & Roe, the contractors.
There is no lien, except in favor of one who
In giving labor or material, has done so,
on the credit of the building. 2 Liens 10.
It is presumed, when it appears that the
materials were furnished for a building,
that they were furnished upou its credit.
Ibid 1I. The lumber was in this case, so
plaintiff's book says, flurnished "on the
Strongjob." It is incumbent on the defendant to repel this presumption, Greeni
v. Thompson, 172 Pa. 609. By his affidavit he undertakes to assume this burden
He does not indicate the evidence by
means of which he expect. to do so, nor is
this necessary. He avers and undertakes
to prove that the credit was given exclusively to the contractor. He must have
the opportunity to do so.
Judgment will not be entered for want
of an adequate affidavit of defence, if the
case, as presented by the plaintiff's pleadings, shows that he ought not to recover. The contractors have, after o1111
forward with the work, abandoned it.
Does this detach any liens that may have
attached? Wethinknot. Burr v. Mazer,
2 Superior 436; Linden Steel Co. v. Refining Co., 146 Pa. 4. In
inclhman v.
Graham, 2 S. & R. 170, lumber was furnished for a house, but was not in fact iIIserted into it, because the contractor, while
in the midst of the construction, became
insolvent. The lien of the materialnan
was not impaired. The arrest of the construction of the Mary Strong hotel was
the result of her own refusal to make payments to the contractors according to her
stipulations. She cannot gain any advantage from it.
The second defence alleged in the affidavit is evasive. The defendant denies that
Joyce and Roe had "authority to let as

my (her) agent," etc. She does not deny
that she made the contract with these per.
sons. She simply denies that she conferred on them the powers.of an agent. The
contractors are not agents in the strict
sense. They may have no authority from
the owner to buy lumber from X or Y.
Indeed. although the owner should direct
the contractor not to buy lumber from X
or Y, X or Y would nevertheless have a
lien, if the contractor in fact purchased
from them. The making of a contract ipso
.facto clothes the contractor with a power
to confer liens on his sub-contractors. The
second defence is unsubstantial.
The third ground of defence is, that the
notice alleged in the claim to have been
given, and the giving of which is not disputed, is insufficient to support a lien.
The act of May 18th, 1887, P. L. 118, 2 P.
& L. *933, universalizes the act of May 1st,
1861, which conferred liens in Chester,
Delaware and Berks counties, for work or
material furnished "for or about the repair
alteration of or addition to any house or
other building" and makes it operative in
all the counties of the state It however,
in its 3d section, enacts that "to entitle
any one to the benefits of this act, he shall
give notice to the owner or reputed owner
of the property, or his or her agent, at the
time of furnishing the materials or performing the work * * * * of his intention to file a lien under the provisions
of this act." Such notice is necessary, in
order to maintain a lien. 2 Liens, 7.
A notice was, in fact, given by Cox &
Brown to Mary Strong. It was given on
July 1st, 1896. All of the ten items in
the bill of particulars preceding this date,
had of course already been furnished.
After it, two items only were supplied.
Has a lien for all the twelve items been
secured or only for the last two? or for
ione? The statute requires that notice be
given "at the time of furnishing the material." When the material or labor is
supplied from day to day or week to week,
the notice need not accompany each delivery of the material, or each day's work
but it should precede the series of deliveries of labor or work. The object of
the notice is to inform the owner whether
lie can safely pay the contractor, and to
what extent from time to time, liens upon
his premises are being imposed. If ma-
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terial is furnished in repeated instalments
over a long period of time, but little would
be accomplished if the notice did not
come until the last delivery. A series of
deliveries of one hundred thousand dollars' worth of goods, stretching through a
year or two might be ended, after an interval of weeks, by a delivery of $5 worth.
It is hard to realize of what advantage
notice, at the last delivery, of the intention to file a lien for the $100,000, would be
to the owner. The notice should be given
at the commencement of tile series. Repetition at each delivery would be unnecessary. The information already given at
the initial point, would abide in the mind
of the owner.
The Act of June 17, 1887, P. L. 409; 2 P.
& L. 2935, after giving a lien on leaseholds, in its 3d section, says, "When the
materials were furnished or labor performed by others than the original contractors,
they shall notify the owner or owners *
of his or their intention to file a mechanics' lien, and unless such notice be given,
no such lien shall be filed nor be of any
validity." Under this act, a notice after
the cessation of work, was held to be too
late. "There is no hardship," says McCollum J., "in exacting from the workmen notice of their intention to file liens
for their labor when they enter upon their
work in the service of the employer."
Strawick v. Nunhall, 139 Pa. 163. The
notice is the "foundation of the lien," the
condition precedent, not subsequent. The
not altogether happy remark is made that
"when" in this statute is equivalent to
"at the time of" in that under consideration, but we cannot doubt "at the time of
performing work" does not mean, at the
time of ending, but at the time of commencing the performance; and that "at
the time of furnishing the materials"
means at the time of commencing to furnish, rather than at the time of completing the furnishing. If material or labor
is furnished in a series, and notice does
not conie to the owner until a portion of
the series has passed by, notice may be
given so as to validate a lien for what
shall be furnished afterwards.
Allison, J's. interpretation of the Act of
June 17, 1887, in Lucas, etc., v. Ruff, 45
Leg. Int. 154, is hardly consistent. with
that of the Supreme Court. It is not nec-

essary to choose between notice at the end
of a series, and notice at each delivery of
the series. Notice may precede a series,
and there may be no necessity of repeating
it.
As we have seen, notice preceded the
last two items furnished to the building of
Mrs. Strong. Tile lien is not invalid as to
them, for want of notice. It is invalid ,as
to the preceding instalments.
As the first ground of defence applies
to the entire claim, the rule for a judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of
defence is discharged.

GRANT BISHOP vs. FARMERS'
BANK.
Right of Bank to demand indemnity for
lost certificate of deposit.
For plaintiff, SEBRING and SHELLENBERGER.
Certificate of deposit is not negotiable
in Pennsylvania. Patterson v. Poindexter, 6 W. & S. 227; Lebanon Batik v. Mangan, 28 Pa. 452.
Anindorsee would take subject to prior
equities; and filder would have to sue in
plaintiff's name. HumboldtSafe Deposit
Co's. Assigned Estate, 3 Pa. C. C. 621.
London
Savings
Fund Society
v.
Hagerstown Savings Bank, 36 Pa. 498.
Plaintiff can recover without giving
bond. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Brown, 4
Am. St. Rep. 526; 45 Q,. 39.
Books of the bank are sufficient evidence of the payments of the debt. Union
Bank v. Knapp, 20 Mass. 96.
HoLcoi:B and CLARK for defendant.
A certificate of deposit is negotiable in
Pa. for the purpose of transfer. Patterson
v. Poindexter, 6 W. & S. 227.
When certificate is lost, the bank has a
right to demand indemnity before payment. Welton v. Adams, 4 Cal. 38; Frank
v. Wessels, 64 N. Y. 155; Dutton v. Bank,
12 W. N. C. 549.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On June 1, 1898, the defendant issued to
the plaintiff a certificate of deposit for
S1000, payable to his order, interest to be
paid at the rate of three per. cent. per annum provided the money be left on deposit for six months.
On January 1st, 1899, Bishop lost his
certificate, and demanded the money from
the bank. This they declined to give
without the surrender of the lost certificate.
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Bishop brings this suit to recover the sum.
The bank declines to pay unless the
plaintiff gives a good bond to indemnify it
against possible loss for $1000, as well as a
bond to protect it from any expenses and
counsel fees which it may be compelled to
incur in the future if again sued on the
lost certificate.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The certificate of deposit in this case
while non-negotiable "for the purposes of
commercial responsibility" was nevertheless payable on the order of the plaintiff.
It was in his power to transfer his title
to the same to another. While the bank
had his assurance that the same had been
lost, it might have been endorsed ini blank
by Bishop and passed to a holder for
value, and there is a possibility that the
bank will be called upon to pay the same
to one having the lawful right to demand
payment. Against such a contingency
the bank has a right to demand protection
-as also against the costs and expenses of
litigation which may be incurred by it.
The loss of the note was not the fault of
the defendant. It was due to the negligence of the plaintiff, and the defendant
must not be put to risk by reason thereof.
This position is well supported by the
authorities. Dutton v. Merchants National Bank, 12 W. N. C. 549, Keyes Appeal, 65 Pa. 196.
The defendant is entitled to indemnity
belore the payment of the certificate of deposit.

ESTATE OF STAYMAN.
Interest on legacy begins to run one year
after death of testator.
For exceptants, LENTZ and DEAL.
Where a testamentary disposition is in
the nature of a charitable use, it bears interest from the death of thb testator.
Townsend's Appeal, 106 Pa. 269; Flickwir's Estate, 136 Pa. 374.
Statute of 1834 is one of "administrative
convenience" and should give way to the
intention of the testator.
Against exceptants, VALENTINE

and

COBLENTZ.

No time being fixed for the payment of
the legacy, it will become due and interest
will begin to run one year after the testator's death. Act of 1834, Feb. 24 ; Koon's

Appeal, 113 Pa. 621 ; Eichelberger's Estate,
170 Pa. 242; 7 Sup. Ct..404; Phillip's Estate, 133 Pa. 426.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Exceptions to the report of the accountant.
On May 1, 1896, Thomas Stayman dies
seized of a large amount of property. As
his executor he appointed Mahlon Briggs.
In his will he bequeathed the sum of
$15000 to Dickinson College, this sum to be
invested and the income to be applied to
the support of a needy student. The balance of his estate he left to his wife.
Briggs filed his account in June of 1898.
He awarded $5000 to the college plus interest from May 1, 1896.
The college excepts to the report claiming that interest should be allowed from
May 1, 1898 Exceptions are now before
an auditor appointed by the court.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Dickinson College has excepted to the
account of Mahlon Briggs the executor of
Thomas Stayman, because of his failure
to allow to it interest on a fund of $5000,
bequeathed for the purpose of supportinga
needy student.
The act of February 24, 1834, provides
that "legacies, if no time be limited for
the payment thereof shall in all cases be
deemed due and payable at the expiration
of one year from the death of the testator."
"This legislation supjilies a testamentary intent, and hence where it is claimed
that a money legacy shall not bear interest from the expiration of one year after
the testator's death, the contention must
be supported by a clear evidence of an intent to the contrary to the act to be found
in the will of the testator." Eichelberger's Estate, 7 Sup. Court 404.
The facts of the case at bar are analogous to those of Koons and Wright, 113
Pa. 621, in which the Supreme Court
reaches the conclusion that the interest
will begin to run one year after the death
of the testator.
The cases of Estate of Flickwir, 136 Pa.
74, and Yale's appeal, 170 Pa. 248, are
clearly distinguished from this in Eichelberger's Estate, upra.
The auditor must therefore dismiss the
exceptions.
By the court.

THE FORUM.
WILLIAM THOMPSON vs. RINDER
BRISON.
Biqht to Priorclaim.for wages under act
of .?ay 10, 1891.
For plaintiff, MYERS and FRANK.
Laborer is entitled to a preferred claim
under the act of 1891. Wolf v. Tillinghast, 3 Pa. Dist. Rep. 388; Sproul v. Murray, 156 Pa. 293.
For defendant, LAvENS and LIGHT.
No notice of claim being given to the
Sheriff, the wages will not have priority.
Allison v. Johnson, 92 Pa. 314.
An employee in a pool-room does not
come under the statute. Pfaender v. Hoffman, 4"W. N. 0. 171; Fill v. Duffy, 6 W.
N. C. 44; Jacobs v. Woods, 14 W. N. C.
237.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Thompson was employed about the pool
room of the defendant. His duties were
to keep the tables, and sell cigars. Wages
due him amounted to $50. The stock of
the defendants was sold by the sheriff.
Thompson claims to have a lien for his
wages, and demands that his claim be first
paid from the fund which Arises from the
sale of the defendant's stock. The court is
asked to determine the right of Thompson
in the fund.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The right of the plaintiff to the preference he claims depends upon whether he
was a laborer or clerk under the act of
May 12, 1891.
The priority is given to "any minor or
mechanic, servant girl at boarding houses,
restaurants or in private families, or any
other servant and helper in and about said
houses of entertainment and private families, porter, hostler nor any other person
employed in and about livery stables or
hotels, laundrymen, or washerwomen,
seamster or seamstress employed by merchant tailors, or by any other person, nilliner, dressmaker, clothier, shirtmaker or
clerk employed in stores or elsewhere, hand
laborer, including farm laborer, or any
other kind of laborer, printer, apprentice,
and other tradesman hired for wages or
salary." While the act is meant to protect the wages of certain employees, it cannot be extended to others not embraced
within the legislative intent. The phraseology of the statute is plain and unambig-

uous. The occupation of the plaintiff is
not embraced within the legislative intent.
The business of keeping a pool room i. not
contemplated by the act. The cases of
Pfaender vs. Hoffman, 4 W. N. C. 171; Fell
v. Duffy, 6 W. N. C. 44; Wentworth's Appeal, 82 Pa. 469, and Jacobs vs. Woods, 14
W. N. C. 237, construing the act of 1872
and its supplement of 1883 show that the
courts are disposed to confine the operation
of these acts, although remedial, to the
kinds of business and class of employment
intended by the legislature.
This was the conclusion of Judge Bechtel after a consideration of a very similar
state of facts. Holt vs. Nlullahey, 7 Dist.
Rep. 294.
We are of the opinion therefore that the
plaintiff is not entitled to be first paid out
of the fund for distribution.
By the Court.

EMMA WILSON, BY HER NEXT
FRIEND NORA BILLINGS vs.
MATHEW WILSON.
The evidence must correspond to the charge
Bucm and FRANCE, attorneys for the
tiff.
Adultery is grounds for a divorce according to the Act of Assembly of March 13,
1815. Gosser v. Gosser, 183 Pa. 499.
What constituted drunkenness, Blaney
v. Blaney, 126 Mass. 205; Mahone v. Mahone, 19 Cal. 627.
1. 5. MCCABE and KATZ, attorneys for
the defendant.
A pleading is irrelevant which has no
substantial relation to the controversy between the parties. Realf v. Realf, 77 Pa.
31; Miller v. Miller, 6 Dist. Rep. 176; Hassett v. Hassett, 5 Pa. Dist. Rep: 604.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On October 1, 1897, a libel in divorce was
filed by theplaintiff against the defendant
charging a wilful, malicious desertion
without reasonable cause for more than
ten years last past. At the hearing the
wife proved drunkenness, infidelity, and
adultery, but did not sustain her charge of
desertion.
On the testimony given the Court is now
asked to grant to the plaintiff an absolute
divorce from the defendant.

THE FORUM.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The charge made by the libellant against
her husband was that he had maliciously
deserted her. Because of this she insisted
upon being divorced. He was called to
answer this charge and no other. It has
long been settled that the evidence must
correspond to the pleadings in the case. A
party may not make out a different case
by proofs from that set forth in his complaint or statement. Realf v. Realf, 77
Pa. 31; Miller v. Miller 6 Dist. Rep. 176.
The testimony offered therefore did not
sustain the libel filed and the divorce is
refused.
By the Court.
BROWN GRENVILLE vs. CUMBER-

LAND VALLEY R. R. CO.
W. H. TAYLOR and H. S. WVINLACK,
attorneys for the plaintiff.
The wilful negligence of the defendant
vas the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries. Oil Creek & Allegha. R. R v.
Kerghron, 74 Pa. 316; Elkins, Bly & Co.
v. McKean, 79 Pa. 493.
A man is answerable for the consequences of his own acts only so far as can
be foreseen, or contemplated by the mind
of the ordinary man. Hoag v. Lake
Shore R. R. Co., 85 Pa. 293; Pa. R. R. Co.
v. Hope, 80 Pa. 373; Pa. R. R. Co. v. Kerr,
62 Pa. &53.
W. R. MYERS and RUNFFER, attorneys
for the defendant.
The company is only liable to the extent that can be foreseen. Pa. R. R. v.
Kerr, 62 Pa. 353; Knight v. Beenken, 30
Pa. 373.
The true rule of proximate cause is the
natural and probable consequences of the
defendant's acts. Hoag v. Lake Shore R.
R. Co., 4 Norris. 293; R. R. Co. v. Skinner, 7 Harris. 812; Frederick v. North C.
R. R. Co., 157 Pa. 116.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The plaintiff in this case was standing
in front of a station waiting for the arrival
of a train on which he expected a friend.
A through train passed rapidly through
the village. It failed to whistle or ring a
bell while passing across a small street running at right angles to it. Richard Alleman not perceiving the train, which neg-

ligently failed to notify pedestrians by
means of whistle or bell, was struck by the
train. He carried on his shoulder a box
of tools. These were thrown for some distance, one striking the plaintiff in the eye,
causing the loss of eyesight, and other injuries to the amount of $5000. He brings
this action to recover.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

While railroad stations are intended to
provide for the waiting of arriving and departing passengers, yet we do not think it
can be held that those who resort thither
to wait the arrival'of friends are trespassers.
The practice is so common and general that
Railway Companies never deny but always
concede, certainly acquiesce in, the custom.
Robert Grenville then was not guilty of
any wrong doing in standing before the
station. He had not placed himself in a
dangerous place, but in one which the
Company itself had provided for its passengers and their attendants.
The case concedes negligence on part of
the defendant, the railroad company, in
not giving notice of its approach by bell or
whistle. But it was urged that Alleman
was negligent and contributed to the accident. This is true, and were he the plaintiff, a recovery might be impossible. But
Grenville seeks the redress, and the defendant is not in the position of the Northern Central Railway Co., in the case of
Fredericks against it and reported in 157
Pa. 116, where the only negligence was
that of a third party and it was held that
the defendant was not responsible for his
wrongful act. It was also insisted that
even if the defendant was negligent yet it
was not the proximate cause of the injury.
We are of a different opinion. The engine
struck Alleman and propelled the tool
which struck the defendant and destroyed
his eye. There was no intermediate agency.
The injury was directly produced by an
instrumentality put in operation by the
engine of the defendant, negligently. It
was as direct as that in case of the oft cited
case of Scott v. Shepherd, 2 Win. Black
893.
The plaintiff is entitled to recover.
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